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¾ÞÄ¿:¹Ì±¹ Àü·«»ç·ÉºÎ »ç·É°üÀ¸·Î Áö¸íµÈ ¾Ø¼­´Ï ÄÚÆ° ¹Ì °ø±º ´ëÀåÀÌ ¡®ÇÙ ¼±Á¦ ºÒ»ç¿ë(No First Use)¡¯ Á¤Ã¥À» ÁöÁöÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ÀڹΠ¾Ø´õ½¼ ±âÀÚ°¡ º¸µµÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¹Ì±¹ Àü·«»ç·ÉºÎ »ç·É°üÀ¸·Î Áö¸íµÈ ¾Ø¼­´Ï ÄÚÆ°(Anthony J. Cotton) ¹Ì °ø±º ´ëÀåÀÌ 15ÀÏ ¹Ì±¹ »ó¿ø ±º»çÀ§¿øȸ °³ÃÖ ÀÎÁØ Ã»¹®È¸¿¡ Á¦ÃâÇÑ ¼­¸é ´äº¯¿¡¼­ ·¯½Ã¾Æ, Áß±¹, ºÏÇÑ °°Àº ÇÙº¸À¯±¹µé°úÀÇ ÁöÁ¤ÇÐÀû »óȲÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ ¡®´ÜÀÏ ¸ñÀû(Sole Purpose)¡¯ ȤÀº ¡®ÇÙ¼±Á¦ ºÒ»ç¿ë(No First Use)¡¯ ¼±¾ð Á¤Ã¥À» ÁöÁöÇÒ °ÍÀ̳Ĵ Áú¹®¿¡ ÁöÁöÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù°í ´äÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¡®ÇÙ ¼±Á¦ ºÒ»ç¿ë¡¯ Á¤Ã¥Àº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ÇÙ °ø°ÝÀ» ´çÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â ÇÑ ¸ÕÀú ÇÙÀ» ¾²Áö ¾Ê´Â °ÍÀÌ¸ç ¡®´ÜÀÏ ¸ñÀû¡¯ Á¤Ã¥Àº ¹Ì±¹À» °ø°ÝÇÑ »ó´ë¿¡ º¸º¹ÇÒ ¶§¸¸ ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ »ç¿ëÇÏ´Â °ÍÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ¾Õ¼­ Á¶ ¹ÙÀÌµç ¹Ì ÇàÁ¤ºÎ´Â Ãâ¹ü ÈÄ º»°ÝÀûÀ¸·Î ¡®´ÜÀÏ ¸ñÀû¡¯ ȤÀº ¡®ÇÙ ¼±Á¦ ºÒ»ç¿ë¡¯ ¿øÄ¢À» ÇÙż¼ °ËÅä º¸°í¼­(NPR)¿¡ Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â ¹æ¾ÈÀ» °ËÅäÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎµµ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÙ¿ì»êÀ̳ª È®Àå¾ïÁ¦ °ø¾àÀÇ ¾àÈ­¸¦ °í·ÁÇØ Áö³­ 12¿ù ¹Ì ±¹¹æºÎ¿¡ ÀÌ µÎ ¿øÄ¢¿¡ ¹Ý´ëÇÏ´Â ÀÔÀåÀ» ¼öÂ÷·Ê Àü´ÞÇßÀ¸¸ç ÀÌÈÄ Áö³­ 3¿ù ¹Ì ±¹¹æºÎ°¡ °ø°³ÇÑ ÇÙż¼°ËÅ亸°í¼­(NPR) ¿ä¾àº»¿¡ µû¸£¸é »ç½Ç»ó ÇÙ¹«±â »ç¿ë¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤Ã¥Àû º¯°æ ¾øÀÌ ±âÁ¸ÀÇ ÇÙ Á¤Ã¥(ÇÙ¼±Á¦ºÒ»ç¿ë ¹Ý´ë)À» À¯ÁöÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ÄÚÆ° Áö¸íÀÚ´Â ¡®ÇÙ ¼±Á¦ ºÒ»ç¿ë¡¯ ¶Ç´Â ¡®´ÜÀÏ ¸ñÀû¡¯ Á¤Ã¥À» ½ÃÇàÇϸé Àü·«Àû ¾ïÁö·Â°ú µ¿¸Í±¹ ¹× µ¿¹ÝÀÚ±¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ È®Àå ¾ïÁ¦ ¾à¼Ó¿¡ ÇØ·Î¿î ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¥ °ÍÀ̶ó¸ç, ÇÙ¹«±â »ç¿ë Àü·«À» ÀǵµÀûÀ¸·Î ¸íÈ®ÇÏ°Ô ¹àÈ÷Áö ¾ÊÀ½À¸·Î½á ÀûÀÇ µµ¹ßÀ» »çÀü¿¡ ¾ïÁ¦ÇÏ´Â ¡®Àü·«Àû ¸ðÈ£¼º¡¯ Á¤Ã¥ÀÌ ºÏÇÑÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÑ ÇÙ¹«Àå Àû´ë±¹µéÀ» ÀúÁöÇÏ´Â °¡Àå È¿°úÀûÀÎ ¹æ¹ýÀ̶ó°í ´äÇß½À´Ï´Ù. (Implementing a ¡°No First Use¡± or ¡°Sole Use¡± policy would have a detrimental effect on strategic deterrence and our extended deterrence commitments to our Allies and partners. A strategy of calculated ambiguity, which is supported by our Allies, is the most effective way to deter Russia, China, North Korea or other nuclear armed adversaries.)
  
  ÄÚÆ° Áö¸íÀÚ´Â À̳¯ û¹®È¸¿¡¼­ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¹Ì»çÀÏ °ø°ÝÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ¹Ì º»Å並 ¹æ¾îÇϱâ À§Çؼ­ Áö»ó±â¹Ý Áß°£´Ü°è ¹Ì»çÀϹæ¾îü°èÀÇ Áö¼ÓÀûÀÎ Çö´ëÈ­»Ó ¾Æ´Ï¶ó È®Àåµµ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù´Â °Í¿¡ µ¿ÀÇÇÏ´À³Ä´Â Á¶´Ï ¾ð½ºÆ® »ó¿øÀÇ¿ø(°øÈ­´ç,¾ÆÀÌ¿À¿Í)ÀÇ Áú¹®¿¡ µ¿ÀÇÇÑ´Ù°í ´äÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ÄÚÆ° Áö¸íÀÚ:¹Ì»çÀÏ ¹æ¾î¿¡ ´ëÇØ, Àú´Â (ºÏÇÑ°ú °°Àº) ºÒ·®±¹°¡µé»Ó ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ¼­·Î ´Ù¸¥ ´É·Â°ú ¿ª·®À» °¡Áø °¡±î¿î µÎ Àû´ë±¹(·¯½Ã¾Æ¿Í Áß±¹)¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¹Ì±¹ º»Å並 º¸È£Çϱâ À§ÇØ ´õ ¸¹Àº ¼±ÅñÇÀ» °¡Áø °ÍÀÌ ³´´Ù´Â °Í¿¡ µ¿ÀÇÇÏ°í ½Í½À´Ï´Ù. (I think when we talk about missile defense, especially with not only rough nations, but now with two adversaries, near peer adversaries, that have different capacities and capabilities, I would agree that for the protection of the homeland, more options is better than less.)
  
  À̾î ÄÚÆ° Áö¸íÀÚ´Â ºÏÇÑÀÌ Á¦±âÇÏ´Â Àå±âÀûÀÎ À§ÇùÀ» ÇØ°áÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¼ö´ÜÀ¸·Î ¹Ì±¹ º»Åä ³» Â÷¼¼´ë ¿ä°Ý±â(NGI)ÀÇ ¹èÄ¡¸¦ ÁöÁöÇÑ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ±×´Â Â÷¼¼´ë ¿ä°Ý±â´Â ºÏÇÑ°ú °°Àº ºÒ·®±¹°¡ÀÇ ¿¹»óµÇ´Â À§Çù¿¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ º¸Á¶¸¦ ¸ÂÃß°í ¾Õ¼­ ³ª°¥ ¼ö ÀÖ°Ô ÇÑ´Ù¸ç, Â÷¼¼´ë ¿ä°Ý±â ¿î¿µÀÇ È¿°ú°¡ ÀÔÁõµÇ¸é ÇöÀçÀÇ Áö»ó ±â¹Ý ¿ä°Ý±â¸¦ Â÷¼¼´ë ¿ä°Ý±â·Î ±³Ã¼ÇÏ´Â °áÁ¤ ¶ÇÇÑ ÁöÁöÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ´äÇß½À´Ï´Ù. (The Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) is designed to increased performance parameters and provide higher reliability, allowing the U.S. to pace and stay ahead of anticipated North Korean and rogue nation threats. If NGI performs as advertised, I would support a Departmental decision to replace the Ground Based Interceptors.)
  
  
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