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Çѹݵµ¿¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Àü¼úÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ Àç¹èÄ¡ÇÏ´Â ¹æ¾È¿¡ ´ëÇÑ »çÀü ³íÀÇ°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù´Â ±Ç°í¸¦ ´ãÀº ¹Ì±¹ ½ÌÅ©ÅÊÅ© º¸°í¼­°¡ ³ª¿Ô½À´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹ ³» Àü¼úÇÙ Àç¹èÄ¡³ª ÀÚü ÇÙº¸À¯°¡ °Å·ÐµÇ´Â °ÍÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ È®Àå¾ïÁ¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀDZ¸½É ¶§¹®À̶ó¸ç À̸¦ ÇØ°áÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¹æ¾Èµµ Á¦½ÃÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¾È¼Ò¿µ ±âÀÚÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÇ ½ÌÅ©ÅÊÅ© Àü·«±¹Á¦¹®Á¦¿¬±¸¼Ò(CSIS)´Â 19ÀÏ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѹݵµ¿¡ Àü¼úÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ Àç¹èÄ¡ÇØ¾ß ÇÒ ¶§¸¦ ´ëºñÇØ »çÀü Áغñ¿¡ µé¾î°¡¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í Á¦¾ÈÇß½À´Ï´Ù. CSIS »êÇÏ ÇѹݵµÀ§¿øȸ´Â À̳¯ °ø°³ÇÑ ¡®´ëºÏÁ¤Ã¥°ú È®Àå¾ïÁ¦(North Korea Policy and Extended Deterrence)¡¯ º¸°í¼­¿¡¼­ ¡°¹Ì·¡ ¾î´À ½ÃÁ¡¿¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÀúÀ§·Â ÇÙ¹«±â¸¦ (Çѱ¹¿¡) Àç¹èÄ¡ÇÒ °¡´É¼º¿¡ ´ëºñÇØ ±âÃÊ ÀÛ¾÷°ú °ü·ÃÇÑ ¸ðÀÇ °èȹ ÈÆ·ÃÀ» µ¿¸Í±¹µéÀÌ °ËÅäÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [º¸°í¼­]¡±Lay pre-decisional groundwork for possible redeployment of US low yield nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The allies should consider tabletop planning exercise for the possible redeployment of US nuclear weapons to South Korea. Such planning exercise could entail cumulative phrases, including Studies of the environmental impacts of redeployment, mapping of possible locations for facilities for storage, joint training on nuclear safety and security, Certifying Korea based US F16 units or F 35 replacements for combined exercise and nuclear mission, more committal physical steps toward redeployment as building storage facilities.¡±
  
  ±×·¯¸é¼­ ¿©±â¿¡´Â Àü¼úÇÙ Àç¹èÄ¡¿¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ ÇÙ¹«±â ÀúÀå°íÀÇ Èĺ¸Áö Æľǰú ÀúÀå ½Ã¼³ Áغñ, ÇÙ¹«±â °ü·Ã º¸¾È ÈÆ·Ã, ÁÖÇѹ̱º F16À̳ª F-35 ÀüÅõ±âÀÇ Ç٠žÀç ÀÎÁõ ÀýÂ÷ µî¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °èȹ ¿¬½ÀÀÌ Æ÷ÇÔµÅ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  À§¿øȸ´Â ´Ù¸¸ ¡°Áö±Ý »óȲ¿¡¼­´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѹݵµ¿¡ Àü¼úÇÙÀ» Àç¹èÄ¡Çϰųª Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÀÚü ÇÙ¹«±â º¸À¯¸¦ ¿ëÀÎÇؼ­´Â ¾È µÈ´Ù¡±°í °­Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é¼­ ¡°½ÇÁ¦ ´Ü°è´Â ´Ù¸¥ ¸ðµç È®Àå¾ïÁ¦ °­È­ ¹æ¾ÈÀ» ½ÃÇàÇÑ µÚ¿¡µµ ºÏÇÑÀÌ À§Çù ¼öÀ§¸¦ ³ôÀÏ ¶§¿¡¸¸ ÃßÁøµÅ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ºÎ¿¬Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [º¸°í¼­]¡±The committal, physical steps would only be pursued if North Korean threat levels continued to escalate after other options to strengthen extended deterrence were exhausted.¡±
  
  À§¿øȸ´Â Çѱ¹ ³» Àü¼úÇÙ Àç¹èÄ¡³ª ÀÚü ÇÙº¸À¯°¡ °Å·ÐµÇ´Â °ÍÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ È®Àå¾ïÁ¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀDZ¸½É ¶§¹®À̶ó¸ç À̸¦ ÇØ°áÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ¹æ¾ÈµéÀ» Á¦½ÃÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [º¸°í¼­] ¡°Create framework for joint nuclear planning, similar to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) planning group. Sustain practices such as sending a senior South Korean liaison officer to US Strategic Command. Reactivate the high level extended deterrence strategy and consultation group. Streamline protocols for direct ¡®space based infrared system¡¯ access to South Korea in addition to the geographic commanders, as the US does for Israel and Japan.¡±
  
  ¸ÕÀú ¹ÌÇÑ ¾ç±¹ÀÌ ºÏ´ë¼­¾çÁ¶¾à±â±¸(NATO¡¤³ªÅä)ÀÇ ÇÙ±âȹ±×·ì°ú ºñ½ÁÇÑ ÇÙ °øµ¿±âȹ ÇùÀÇü¸¦ ¸¸µé°í, Áö±Ýó·³ ¹Ì±¹ Àü·«»ç·ÉºÎ¿¡ Çѱ¹±º °íÀ§ ¿¬¶ôÀå±³¸¦ °è¼Ó ÆÄ°ßÇÒ °ÍÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ °íÀ§±Þ ¹ÌÇÑ È®Àå¾ïÁ¦Àü·«ÇùÀÇü Àç°¡µ¿µµ ÁÖ¹®Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¾Æ¿ï·¯ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ À̽º¶ó¿¤°ú ÀϺ»¿¡°Ô Çã¿ëÇϵíÀÌ Çѱ¹µµ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¹Ì»çÀÏ Á¶±â°æº¸Ã¼°èÀÎ ¡®¿ìÁÖ ±â¹Ý Àû¿Ü¼± ½Ã½ºÅÛ¡¯À» Á÷Á¢ »ç¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇÒ °ÍÀ» ±Ç°íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¶ÇÇÑ À§¿øȸ´Â ÇÙÀá¼öÇÔ°ú Àü·«Æø°Ý±â µîÀ» Çѹݵµ ÁÖº¯¿¡ »ó½Ã Àü°³ÇÏ°í Çѱ¹¿¡ ¹Ì±ºÀÇ ÇÙ¹«ÀåÀÌ °¡´ÉÇÑ Ç×°ø±â¸¦ ¼ö¿ëÇÒ ½Ã¼³¿¡ ÅõÀÚÇÒ °ÍÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ¾î ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ °í°íµµ¹Ì»çÀϹæ¾îü°è(TTHAD¡¤»çµå) Ãß°¡ ¹èÄ¡¿Í Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¡®Å³Ã¼ÀΡ¯ ´É·Â È®º¸, Çѱ¹Çü ¾ÆÀ̾𵼠Á¶±â ¹èÄ¡µµ Áö¿øÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í µ¡ºÙ¿´½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ±×·¯¸é¼­ ÀÌ´Â ¡°Çѹݵµ¿¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Àü¼úÇÙ¹«±â°¡ Àç¹èÄ¡µÇ´Â °ÍÀ» º¸°í ½ÍÁö ¾ÊÀ¸¸é À§Çù ¼öÁØÀ» °íÁ¶ÇÏ´Â ÇàÀ§¸¦ ¸ØÃ߶ó´Â ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ »õ·Î¿î ¾Ð¹ÚÀÌ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù. À§¿øȸ´Â ¹«¾ùº¸´Ù È®Àå¾ïÁ¦¿¡´Â ¹°¸®Àû ¿ª·®¸¸Å­À̳ª ½É¸®Àû ºÎºÐÀÌ Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù´Â Á¡µµ °­Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [º¸°í¼­] ¡°For extended deterrence o be effective, North and South Korea must also believe that the US is willing to use these capabilities to defend its allies even if it means risking Washington DC, or New York to save Soule or Tokyo.¡±
  
  À§¿øȸ´Â ¡°È®Àå¾ïÁ¦ÀÇ ½ÇÈ¿¼ºÀ» À§Çؼ­´Â ºÏÇÑ°ú Çѱ¹Àº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ¼­¿ïÀ̳ª µµÄ츦 ±¸Çϱâ À§ÇØ ¿ö½ÌÅÏ DC³ª ´º¿åÀÌ À§Çè¿¡ ºüÁö´õ¶óµµ È®Àå ¾ïÁ¦·ÂÀ» µ¿¸Í ¹æ¾î¿¡ »ç¿ëÇÒ ÀÇÁö°¡ ÀÖ´Ù°í ¹Ýµå½Ã ¹Ï¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù. µû¶ó¼­ ¹Ì±¹Àº ¸ðµç ¹üÁÖÀÇ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¹æÀ§ ¿ª·®À» ÀÌ¿ëÇØ Çѱ¹¿¡ È®Àå ¾ïÁ¦·ÂÀ» Á¦°øÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¾à¼ÓÀ» ÃÖ°íÀ§±Þ ¼öÁØ¿¡¼­ °è¼Ó ¾Ë·Á¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  À§¿øȸ´Â ±×·¯¸é¼­ ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹ÀÌ '¿î¸í°øµ¿Ã¼'¶ó´Â ÀνÄÀÌ Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ºÏÇÑÀÇ Çѱ¹ °ø°Ý ½Ã ÁÖÇѹ̱º 2¸¸8õ ¸í°ú Çѱ¹¿¡ °ÅÁÖÇÏ´Â ¸¹Àº ¹Ì±¹Àεµ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹Þ´Â´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» °­Á¶ÇØ Àü·«ÀûÀ¸·Î ºÏÇÑÀÌ Çѱ¹À» °ø°ÝÇÒ ¼ö ¾øµµ·Ï ¸¸µé¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â °Ì´Ï´Ù.
  
  À§¿øȸ´Â º¸°í¼­¿¡¼­ Áß±¹ÀÇ Çù·ÂÀ» ±â´ëÇϱ⠾î·Á¿î »óȲÀ̶ó´Â Á¡À» ÁöÀûÇÏ¸ç ¹ÌÇÑÀÏ 3ÀÚÇù·ÂÀÇ Á߿伺µµ °­Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [º¸°í¼­]"The US, South Korea, and Japan look for ways to trilateralize operational activity that involves strategic assets, such as along the lines of Blue Lightning missions. The allies should consider undertaking a nuclear planning exercise trilaterally.¡±
  
  ¸ÕÀú ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹, ÀϺ»ÀÌ ¡®ºí·ç¶óÀÌÆᯠÈƷðú °°Àº ¹æ½ÄÀ¸·Î 3±¹°£ Àü·«ÀÚ»ê ¿î¿ëÀ» Á¶À²ÇÏ´Â ¹æ¾ÈÀ» Á¦¾ÈÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¡®ºí·ç¶óÀÌÆá¯Àº ±¡ ¾Ø´õ½¼ ±âÁö¿¡ ¹èÄ¡µÈ B-52H Àå°Å¸® Æø°Ý±â³ª B-1B Àü·«Æø°Ý±â¸¦ Çѹݵµ¿¡ Ã⵿½ÃÄÑ À¯»ç½Ã ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ½É ½Ã¼³ Æø°ÝÇÏ´Â ÀÓ¹«¸¦ ¿¬½ÀÇÏ´Â ÈÆ·ÃÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ¼¼ ³ª¶ó°£ Çù·ÂÀ» ³íÀÇÇÒ ¼ö Àִ ä³ÎÀÎ ´ëºÏÁ¤Ã¥Á¶Á¤°¨µ¶±×·ìÀ» ´Ù½Ã ¿­°í Á¤º¸¸¦ °øÀ¯ÇÏ¸ç ¹Ì»çÀÏ ¹æ¾î¿Í À§±â ´ëÀÀ °èȹ, 3ÀÚ ÈÆ·Ã Á¤·ÊÈ­ µîÀ¸·Î Çù·ÂÀ» È®´ëÇÒ °Íµµ ÁÖ¹®Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¾Æ¿ï·¯ À§¿øȸ´Â ºÏÇÑ°úÀÇ Çù»ó°ú °ü·ÃÇؼ­´Â ´ëÈ­°¡ Àç°³µÉ ¶§¸¦ ÁغñÇØ¾ß ÇѴٸ鼭, ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ Á¶°Ç ¾øÀÌ ´ëÈ­¿¡ ³ª¼³ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â Àǻ縦 °è¼Ó Àü´ÞÇÏ°í ´ëºÏƯº°´ëÇ¥¸¦ »ó±ÙÁ÷À¸·Î µÑ °ÍÀ» ±Ç°íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  º¸°í¼­¸¦ ÀÛ¼ºÇÑ CSIS ÇѹݵµÀ§¿øȸ´Â Á¸ Çܸ® CSIS ¼ÒÀå°ú Á¶¼Á ³ªÀÌ ÇϹöµå´ë ±³¼ö, ¸®Ã³µå ¾Æ¹ÌƼÁö Àü ±¹¹«ºÎ ºÎÀå°ü, ºó¼¾Æ® ºê·è½º Àü ÁÖÇѹ̱º»ç·É°ü, À¢µð ĿƲ·¯ Àü ¹Ì ¹«¿ª´ëÇ¥ºÎ(USTR) ºÎ´ëÇ¥ µî ¹Ì ÀüÁ÷ °íÀ§ °ü¸®¿Í Çѹݵµ Àü¹®°¡ µî 14¸íÀ¸·Î ±¸¼ºµÆ½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ºê·è½º Àü »ç·É°üÀº 19ÀÏ º¸°í¼­¿Í °ü·ÃÇØ ¿­¸° ¼³¸íȸ¿¡¼­ À§¿øȸ´Â Çö »óȲ ¾Æ·¡¼­, ƯÈ÷ Çѹݵµ ³» ÇÙ¹«±â È®»êÀ» ¸·±â À§ÇÑ È®Àå ¾ïÁ¦·ÂÀÇ µÎ ¹ø° ¸ñÀûÀ» °í·ÁÇÒ ¶§ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Àü¼úÇÙ ¹èÄ¡³ª Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÇÙ¹«±â °³¹ßÀÌ Áö±ÝÀº µµ¿òÀÌ µÇÁö ¾Ê°í ÇÊ¿äÇÏÁöµµ ¾Ê´Ù´Â Á¡À» ºÐ¸íÈ÷ Çß´Ù°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [ºê·è½º Àü »ç·É°ü]¡°Commission was very clear that under the present circumstances, especially given the second purpose of extended deterrence, which is to prevent proliferation that nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, US being added or South Korean being developed is not helpful at the present time nor needed.¡±
  
  Á¸ Çܸ® CSIS ¼ÒÀåÀº Çѱ¹ ±¹¹Î 70%°¡ ºÏÇÙ À§Çù¿¡ µû¸¥ ¾Èº¸ ºÒ¾ÈÀ¸·Î ÀÚü ÇÙ¹«±â °³¹ßÀ» ÁöÁöÇÑ´Ù´Â ¼³¹®Á¶»ç¸¦ ºÃ´Ù¸ç Çѱ¹ÀεéÀÌ µ¿¸Í±¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ È®Àå ¾ïÁ¦ ÀÇÁö¸¦ ½Å·ÚÇϱ⠹ٶõ´Ù°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [Çܸ® ¼ÒÀå]¡°I would say you already have it, we are the ones that are the custodians for it. You have guarantee that we are going to support and defend Korea. So the question is that can we find ways to strengthen your confidence, Korean confidence in the US¡±
  
  Çܸ® ¼ÒÀåÀº ¹Ì±¹Àº Çѱ¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹æ¾î¿Í Áö¿øÀ» º¸ÀåÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù¸ç, ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ½Å·Ú¸¦ °­È­ÇÏ´Â ¹æ¾ÈÀ» ã´Â °ÍÀÌ °ü°ÇÀ̶ó°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  
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